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in the years to come. The challenge
is to make the differences work for
Texas and not against it.
Texas: Big in Every Way
Historically, Texas’ population
has grown faster than the nation’s.
This was especially true during the
boom days of the 1970s, when the
state’s population rose at more than
two times the national rate (Chart 1).
From 1980 to 1989, the state’s
average annual population growth
of 1.9 percent was slower than in
the preceding decade but still double
that of the nation.
In the 1990s, Texas’ population
has continued to grow faster than
the national average, and in 1994,
Texas edged out New York as the
second largest state in the country,
behind California. Texas’ population
should continue to grow faster than
its national counterpart, although
it will follow a national trend of
slower growth. Census projections
indicate that through the year 2010,
Texas’ population will grow at an
average annual rate of about 1.5
percent, while the U.S. population
will grow at an annual rate of about
1 percent.1
Two main factors explain why
Texas’ population growth histori-
cally has outpaced the nation’s:
higher than average birth rates and
high net migration—the number
of people moving to Texas from
other states or from other countries
minus the number leaving.
While both national and Texas
birth rates have fallen since the baby
boom years, Texas’ birth rate has
stayed consistently higher than the
national average. In 1992, for ex-
ample, the Texas birth rate was 18.1
per thousand people, compared
with the national average of 15.9
per thousand. The high Texas birth









s the 21st century nears, demo-
graphic changes are reshaping
the U.S. economy. The largest im-
pact is coming from the maturing of
baby boomers who began turning
50 this January. Just behind the
boomers is the baby bust generation,
which makes up a much smaller
share of the total population. As the
boomers and busters move through
their life cycles, many elements of
the economy—such as housing, un-
employment, labor productivity and
capital formation—will be affected.
Texas, like the nation, will be
influenced as this demographic
transition unfolds. Nevertheless, the
Texas population historically has
been somewhat different from that
of the nation. In the past, the Texas
population has grown faster than
the national average. In addition,
Texas is more ethnically diverse
and younger than most other states.
These differences may benefit Texas
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birth rates are higher than they are
in the United States, have kept
Texas’ birth rate higher than aver-
age. However, over the long run,
U.S. Hispanic birth rates have been
converging toward the rates for
non-Hispanic whites.
In addition to high birth rates,
net migration has played a large
part in the state’s strong population
growth. Historically, people have
been drawn to Texas because of its
abundant natural resources. In more
recent years, people have been
drawn to the state because of its
healthy economy and other eco-
nomic factors that make it an attrac-
tive place to live and do business.
During the oil boom of the 1970s
and early 1980s, net migration
accounted for an unusually large
portion of the state’s population
growth. In 1982—a year in which
the Texas population grew a robust
4 percent—the total increase in the
population was 586,000 people,
and almost 70 percent of the in-
crease resulted from net migration.2
In the early 1980s, when the na-
tional economy turned downward,
Texas drew more new residents
than any other state.3 However, the
statewide downturn that began in
1986 caused Texas to lose many of
its new residents. From 1987 through
1989, 305,134 people left the state
to look for greener pastures else-
where, resulting in anemic popula-
tion growth.
In 1990 the exodus stopped
and people began returning to the
state, drawn by Texas’ improving
economy. Since 1990, net migration
has accounted for roughly 40 per-
cent of the state’s population in-
crease, a lower percentage than that
of the 1970s but higher than the
migration experienced in the 1980s
overall. While net migration to the
Lone Star State is expected to be
positive, it may be less of a con-
tributor to state population growth
in coming years than it has been in
the 1990s, according to forecasts by
the Census Bureau and Texas Comp-
troller of Public Accounts. Census
Bureau projections indicate that net
migration will account for roughly
30 percent of Texas’ population
increase through 2010, close to the
historical state average since 1950.
Differences in Age Structure
And Diversity
Both of the factors that contrib-
ute to Texas’ fast-growing popula-
tion—a high birth rate and a high
percentage of net migration—keep
the Texas population younger than
the national average. High birth
rates boost the state’s share of
Chart 2
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“Not only is Texas’
population younger
than average, it is also
more diverse. The Texas
population has a much
higher share of racial
and ethnic minorities
than the U.S. population
in general, mostly due
to the state’s historical
ties to Mexico.”3
people in younger age brackets,
and studies show that most people
who move to Texas from other
states or countries are young adults.
In 1994, Texas was the third
youngest state in the country, behind
Utah and Alaska. The median age
in Texas was 31.9 years, compared
with a national median of 34 years.
Texas’ younger population is espe-
cially evident when we look at the
distribution of the population by
age group. As Chart 2 shows, Texas
has higher than average percentages
of its population in the younger age
brackets and smaller than average
percentages in the age brackets 35
and above.4
Not only is Texas’ population
younger than average, it is also more
diverse. The Texas population has
a much higher share of racial and
ethnic minorities than the U.S. popu-
lation in general, mostly due to the
state’s historical ties to Mexico. In
1995, 58 percent of Texans were
non-Hispanic whites, which com-
pares with 74 percent of the U.S.
population. While the percentage
of African–American Texans is
about even with the national aver-
age of 13 percent, Texas’ Hispanic
population accounts for 28 percent
of the total population, much larger
than the national average of 10 per-
cent. In fact, in 1995 Texas ranked
second among the states in its share
of Hispanic population, behind
New Mexico.
The trend toward diversity should
continue into the next century. The
Hispanic share of the population
is expected to continue growing
rapidly and by 2010 should reach
36 percent. In addition, the share of
Asian–American Texans is expected
to rise at a fast pace. In 15 years,
the “minority” populations are ex-
pected to constitute the majority of
Texans (Chart 3).5
Despite Its Differences,
Texas Will Follow the Aging Trend
Despite being younger than the
national average, Texas’ overall
population will age along with the
national population. This “aging”
of the population is a result of the
maturing of the baby boom genera-
tion, which makes up the largest
segment of the population. Chart 4
shows the movement of the baby
boom generation through time and
its effect on the age distribution in
Texas. As the chart indicates, in 1971
the boomers were swelling the
ranks of the 5–14 and 15–24 age
brackets, causing the age distribu-
tion to be skewed toward those
younger age groups. Ten years
later, the baby boomers had caused
an increase in the share of the
population aged 25–34, the ages
most associated with household
formation and entry-level home de-
mand. By the mid-1990s, many of
the boomers had moved into the
35–44 age bracket, and the share of
the population in that age bracket
rose substantially.
By 2010 a large share of Texans
will be in their prime working years,
and the age distribution will shift
further to the right. As the first of
the baby boomers come within an
arm’s reach of retirement that year,
an estimated 22 percent of Texans
will be 55 or older, compared with
17 percent today. Still, Texas’ share
of those 55 or older should be
below the projected national aver-
age of 25 percent.
How Will U.S. Demographic
Trends Shape the Future?
As the bulk of the population
continues its move into the prime
working years and then on into re-
tirement, it will have a broad im-
pact on the economy. Although it is
difficult—and dangerous—to try to
predict the future, the changes that
will occur in the age distribution of
the population have implications
for some segments of the economy.
Housing. First, the demographic
shift is expected to have a signifi-
Chart 4
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cant impact on the U.S. homebuild-
ing industry. In the coming years, a
decline in the number of house-
holds headed by people ages 25 to
34 should cause a shift away from
starter homes toward trade-up
homes and specialized homes for
older adults. As a result, residential
construction will no longer be driven
by the first-time buyer and builders
will have to focus on “resizers.” In
addition, prices of starter homes
and homes for families with young
children may weaken, while prices
of homes that are popular with
older adults, or empty-nesters, may
increase.
The purely demographic effect
of the changing age distribution
suggests a potential slowdown in
the growth of the residential con-
struction industry.6 Nevertheless,
increases in immigration levels or a
pickup in construction due to home
remodeling by aging baby boomers
could keep residential construction
on its current path.7
Labor Market. When baby boomers
entered the working world, their
sheer numbers caused them to have
a substantial impact on the U.S.
labor market. The young-adult labor
force grew rapidly during the late
1960s and 1970s, and because baby
boomers were at the age when
frequent entries into and exits from
the labor force are more common,
they exerted upward pressure on
the national unemployment rate.
In the 1980s, the proportion of
young people in the labor force
shrank steadily, and eventually this
reversal of demographic trends
applied downward pressure on the
unemployment rate (excluding
increases during the 1980 and
1981–82 recessions). The 1980s
closed with an unemployment rate
of 5.3 percent, half a percentage
point below its level a decade
earlier.8
During the 1990s and beyond,
much of the increase in the working-
age population will be concentrated
in the 35 to 64 age group. People
in this group have exhibited high
rates of labor force participation
and low rates of unemployment,
implying continued downward
pressure on the unemployment rate.
Also, people in this age group are
near their most productive years,
which could boost labor force
productivity.
In the coming years, labor force
growth is expected to slow along
with the rate of population growth.
This could be good for the baby
bust generation, those people now
20 to 31 years old. Because busters
constitute a smaller than normal
generation, employers may have
to pay a premium for good, highly
skilled entry-level workers. In addi-
tion, as labor becomes more scarce,
businesses may become more in-
novative, creating labor saving
technology that would boost pro-
ductivity growth.
Other Implications. Demographic
trends will affect many other seg-
ments of the economy as well. As
the baby boomers near retirement,
they may save more, thereby boost-
ing the national savings rate. In
fact, some researchers have sug-
gested that the run-up in the stock
market in the past few years may
be due to the aging boomers’ rush
to prepare for their golden years.
The consensus on this view is mixed,
and there is a downside as well.
As boomers begin retiring, the
savings rate could begin to decline
and stock values could fall.9 Other
researchers predict that as the
boomers retire, not only will sav-
ings rates decline, but the smaller
workforce will mean less need
for the accumulation of capital—
such as factories and machines.10
While the baby boomers won’t
begin retiring in large numbers until
the year 2011, already there is grow-
ing concern about the financing of
government spending programs
for the elderly, like Medicare and
Social Security. An aging popula-
tion means that health care and
retirement will consume a larger
share of government spending.
With a smaller proportion of work-
ing-age Americans supporting a
larger number of elderly, this sug-
gests higher tax burdens for future
workers.11
Do Texas’ Differences Matter?
Despite its different demographic
characteristics, Texas will follow
national trends for the most part in
the coming years. Although the state
has a younger and faster growing
population than the nation, its rate
of population growth will slow and
its population will become older.
Chart 5
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Nevertheless, there are some areas
in which Texas may be affected
differently from the nation because
of its unique demographic trends.
These areas include housing, retail
sales and labor force growth.
First, as Chart 5 shows, Texas
housing construction follows changes
in population to a large extent, but
with a lag. The expectation that
Texas’ population growth will slow
suggests slower growth in residen-
tial construction. However, the
state’s demographic characteristics
suggest that the population-induced
slowdown in housing demand will
be less evident in Texas than in the
nation as a whole.
Housing construction in Texas
should be bolstered by the state’s
younger population. Through the
year 2010, the number of people in
the 25–34 age group is expected
to fall more than 7 percent in the
United States. In contrast, the number
of Texans aged 25–34 is expected
to increase by about 4 percent over
the same period. It is precisely this
age group that is responsible for
start-up housing demand, the seg-
ment that will be most negatively
affected at the national level.
Second, Texas’ faster than aver-
age rate of population increase
should draw retailers and other
consumer-oriented businesses to the
state. Chart 6 shows that retail sales
have grown faster in Texas than in
the nation since 1970, a trend that
is likely to continue because of the
state’s demographic characteristics.
Finally, Texas labor force growth
should be affected as population
growth slows and the population
becomes older. With fewer workers
entering the labor force and a larger
share of Texans at their most pro-
ductive working ages, we could
see a slowdown in labor force
growth coupled with an increase
in productivity in the next 10 to 15
years. Still, Texas is likely to have a
larger than average share of young
workers to draw from because of
its younger age distribution, mean-
ing labor force growth should
remain higher than the national
average. This would be a positive
factor for Texas businesses in areas
with tight labor markets, making
it less difficult to fill entry-level
positions.
Because of Texas’ growing
diversity, minorities represent the
largest segment of new entrants
into the labor force, a trend that
will continue. Unfortunately, mi-
norities are more likely to drop out
of school; therefore, they may lack
some necessary skills for labor-
market entry. While improving in
recent years, the 1993–94 cumula-
tive dropout rate for grades 7
through 12 was 21.1 percent for
Hispanic students and 17.8 percent
for African–American students,
compared with a rate of about 9
percent for non-Hispanic whites
and Asian–Americans.12
Because of the high dropout
rates for minority Texans, they are
less likely to obtain the necessary
education for high-skill, high-wage
positions. Thus, it may be harder
for employers to recruit them into
the technology-based entry-level
positions of the future. And if the
labor pool does not have the right
job skills, the Texas economy will
not be able to grow at its potential.
A challenge for Texas will be to
train and educate these young
Texans and successfully assimilate




1 U.S. and Texas population estimates and
forecasts are from the U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
2 Historical migration estimates were ob-
tained from John Sharp, Texas Comp-
troller of Public Accounts.
3 Early 1980s refers to 1980 through 1983.
4 A big question mark in Texas’ popula-
tion picture is the number of undocu-
mented immigrants not included in
census statistics. A Census Bureau study
estimates that in 1994, 300,000 to 427,000
undocumented immigrants lived in
Texas. These undocumented immigrants
not only add to the total population
figures but are likely to have demo-
graphic characteristics similar to other
immigrants that would contribute to a
younger population.
5 Projections of the proportion of Texas
residents by race and ethnicity are from
the Texas State Data Center at Texas
A&M University in College Station.
6 See Kent Hill and D’Ann Petersen,
“Demographics and the Long-Term
Outlook for Housing Investment,” Eco-
nomic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, First Quarter 1994.
7 See Paul Emrath, “Immigration and
Housing Demand,” Housing Economics,
March 1994, for an explanation of how
future immigration is likely to affect U.S.
housing demand.
8 The information regarding the baby
boom’s impact on the unemployment
rate comes from “Population Changes,
the Baby Boom, and the Unemploy-
ment Rate,” Monthly Labor Review,
August 1990.
9 See “The Year Is 2010. Do You Know
Where Your Bull Is?” New York Times,
March 10, 1996.
10 See Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J.
Kotlikoff, “The Impact of the Demo-
graphic Transition on Capital Formation,”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
(94), 1992.
11 For an explanation of how immigration
might affect the U.S. age structure,
thereby offsetting the increased fiscal
burden of an aging population, see
Kjetil Storesletten, “The Economics of
Immigration,” graduate dissertation, the
Graduate School of Industrial Adminis-
tration at Carnegie Mellon University,
May 1995.
12 Texas Education Agency, 1993–94
Texas Public School Dropout Report,
September 1995.
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to U.S. citizens: the “taxes” paid by
foreigners holding dollars reduces
the amount of income taxes that
must be collected from U.S. citizens.
If U.S. taxpayers benefit from
seignorage, why doesn’t the Federal
Reserve make the dividend even
larger by printing more currency
and raising more seignorage from
foreigners? The answer is because
people worldwide seek honest
money, an attribute the U.S. dollar
would quickly lose if the Fed aban-
doned its pursuit of low inflation.
By limiting the amount of currency
in circulation, the Fed can provide
a stable-valued currency and keep
the dollar competitive against the
numerous alternative currencies
available to the public, such as the
German mark, the Japanese yen and
the Swiss franc. Inflationary policies
would undermine the dollar’s value
and send dollar-holders to a more
honest currency.
When it comes to raising revenue,
honesty is the best monetary policy.
The best monetary policy imposes
its own internal discipline, limiting
the amount of currency printed.
From time to time, people call for
a form of external discipline—a
return to the gold standard. Ameri-
cans taxpayers, however, can benefit
more from a fiat money standard
in which the value of currency is
stable over time than from a return
to the gold standard.
Fiat Money or Gold?
Until August 1971, the United
States maintained the gold standard,
a monetary policy that backed
every bill in circulation with gold.
Under the gold standard, the num-
ber of dollars circulating was deter-
mined solely by the quantity of gold
held by the Fed. Consequently, a
gold strike in Alaska, California or
anywhere else that added to the Fed’s
gold reserves meant more money
could be circulated. Conversely, a
loss of gold reserves meant the Fed
had to take an equal amount of
currency out of circulation.
An attractive feature of the gold
P
eople the world over recognize
the U.S. dollar. Above George
Washington’s portrait, the words
“Federal Reserve Note” carry a
promise in which many people trust.
It’s the promise of honest money
that holds its value.
Some $375 billion today circu-
lates in the United States and abroad.
Not only is the U.S. dollar held
more widely worldwide than any
other currency, estimates indicate
that more American currency is held
abroad than in the United States.
What U.S. citizen touring abroad
hasn’t seen U.S. currency used in
exchange for goods and services?
American money circulates in
Mexico, Israel, Russia, virtually
every foreign country. Today, the
U.S. dollar is the world’s currency
of choice, and it has been for
several decades.
This popularity does not mean,
however, that the dollar faces no
competition from other currencies,
or that an infinite supply of U.S.
currency should be made available
to the world. In fact, the dollar’s
widespread use in foreign countries
raises several questions. Do foreign
holdings of dollars help or hurt
Americans? And what, if anything,
should be done to safeguard the
dollar’s value? Understanding the
answers to these questions lies in
understanding how the government
finances its spending and, in par-
ticular, the role of seignorage.
Seignorage is the volume of
goods and services that govern-
ments buy with the fiat money they
print. Fiat money is paper currency
that’s not backed by gold or other
tangible assets. In effect, seignorage
is an alternative to income taxation
for financing government spending.
The United States’ seignorage oppor-
tunity has been somewhat unique.
Because 50 percent or more of all
U.S. dollars are held abroad, for-
eigners, as well as U.S. citizens,
bear the burden of U.S. seignorage.
So, seignorage not only substitutes
for income taxation, it also repre-
sents a means of “taxing” foreigners.
Seignorage amounts to a small gift
“When it comes to raising
revenue, honesty is the best
monetary policy. The best
monetary policy imposes its
own internal discipline,
limiting the amount of
currency printed.”7
standard was that it imposed an
external restraint on the Fed. With-
out additional gold, the Fed could
not add money to the economy.
Money was backed by gold reserves,
so sustained episodes of inflation
could not occur. If paper money
was devalued by inflation, people
traded currency for gold, which
reduced the money supply and put
the clamps on inflation. Hence, the
value of money was dictated by the
official dollar price of gold.
Today, the Fed does not back
each bill with gold. Instead, the
value of fiat money is maintained
through the Fed’s restraint in main-
taining honest monetary policy.
The reason a fiat money standard
can make people better off than
they would be under a gold stan-
dard is simple. Under the gold stan-
dard, huge quantities of precious
metal had to sit in Fed warehouses
to back the currency. A fiat standard
lets people benefit from seignorage
and releases the gold for people to
enjoy, benefits that accrue as long
as the Fed pursues a stable value
of the dollar and refrains from ex-
cessive money creation.
Taxes or T-bills?
To understand the effects of
seignorage, one needs to understand
how government pays for its pur-
chases. Government can pay for
goods and services by taxing,
borrowing, or printing currency.
Under today’s fiat money standard,
budget revenue is raised through
seignorage when the Federal Re-
serve buys U.S. Treasury securities
in the form of T-bonds or T-bills.
Essentially, the Fed trades currency
for Treasury debt, indirectly pay-
ing for the Treasury’s purchases.
(If the Treasury paid off its debt,
the fiat money would effectively
be backed by the Treasury’s taxing
authority. However, historically the
Fed has written off the Treasury’s
obligations.1)
Seignorage is an alternative to
income taxes or greater public in-
debtedness, not a free lunch. Over-
reliance on seignorage violates the
honest money principle and amounts
to an attempt to get something for
nothing. But the economics of supply
and demand prevent that from
happening: if supply increases, the
price falls. For money, the price is
its value—how many goods and
services it can buy—and the rate
at which money’s value falls is
inflation.
Chart 1 provides evidence of the
close correlation between changes
in the money supply and the price
level, which is used to gauge infla-
tion. The chart plots the amount of
currency in the hands of the public
Chart 1
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“Seignorage is an alternative
to income taxes or greater
public indebtedness, not a
free lunch. Overreliance
on seignorage violates the
honest money principle and
amounts to an attempt to get
something for nothing.”8
plus bank reserves (base money)
and the U.S. consumer price index
for 1975–93. The two lines are
nearly perfectly correlated, indicat-
ing that rapid growth of the supply
of fiat money lowers the dollar’s
value through inflation.
Between 1993 and 1994, the
United States raised about $31 bil-
lion through seignorage. This sum
represents about 1.6 percent of
federal spending. On the surface, it
might appear that a higher level of
seignorage would yield greater tax
savings for the U.S. taxpayer because
the Fed, in effect, could export
some of the seignorage “tax” to for-
eign countries. That policy, how-
ever, could have unintended results.
The Temptation to Tax Foreigners
Researchers have coined the term
“dollarization” to describe what
happens when the dollar or other
foreign currency circulates along
with a local currency.2 Estimates
indicate that U.S. currency circulat-
ing abroad is between 50 percent
and 78 percent of the total, or be-
tween $187.5 billion to $300 billion
of the $375 billion in circulation.3
A comparison with the German
mark highlights U.S. dominance as
a supplier of currency to the world.
German marks in circulation today
total about 250DM billion. Suppose,
for example, that 33 percent of all
marks were held outside Germany.
Then roughly 83DM billion, or, at
today’s exchange rate, the equiva-
lent of about $52 billion, would be
held outside Germany. Even if all
marks in circulation today were
held outside Germany, they would
be equivalent to only about $167
billion, still smaller than the most
conservative estimate of U.S. dollars
circulating abroad.
The volume of U.S. dollars circu-
lating abroad means that non-U.S.
citizens bear part of the seignorage
burden. And while a government
that overtaxes its constituents may
be ousted at election time, nonciti-
zens holding dollars in foreign
countries don’t vote—so why not
raise the seignorage “tax”?
Such a temptation is tempered
by market competition. The more
inflationary monetary policy be-
comes, the less attractive the cur-
rency becomes as a store of value.
Dollarization occurs in some coun-
tries because the public doesn’t
trust the local currency as a store of
value, frequently because inflation
in the country has been high in the
past. So, the hint of inflation can
cause people to exchange one
foreign currency for another that
seems more stable. In short, the
dollar’s dominance could be lost
quickly if the Fed suddenly in-
creased seignorage and caused
people to question the dollar’s
future value.
And if the Fed reversed its mone-
tary policy course, creating money
at a much faster rate, then exten-
sive foreign holdings of U.S. cur-
rency could exacerbate the effects
of inflation fears. As foreign dollar-
holders’ confidence in the dollar
eroded, they would trade dollars
for another currency they perceived
as more honest, potentially en masse.
In economic terms, demand for the
dollar would fall sharply, pushing
inflation up even faster. If the Fed
failed to reduce the supply of cur-
rency to match the lower demand,
the inflationary consequences would
be made worse by the volume of
U.S. currency being unloaded
abroad. The ensuing mass reversal
of currency flows—from foreigners
to the United States—could prove
overwhelming.
Incentives for Honest Money
The trust people around the
world are willing to place in the
U.S. dollar owes largely to the
United States’ reputation for keep-
ing its promises and its track record
of monetary stability. Through
seignorage, the dollar’s popularity
abroad yields a dividend for Ameri-
can taxpayers that was not avail-
able under the gold standard.
Proponents of the gold standard
cite its low-inflation record. These
“It is the commitment,
not the commodity,
that makes paper money
hold its value—then
and now. The real
standard is honesty,
not gold.”9
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days, money’s stable value during
the gold standard has come to be
associated with gold per se. How-
ever, the gold standard ultimately
worked because of restraint, the
restraint to hold gold’s dollar price
constant rather than make periodic
revaluations. In short, it is the
commitment, not the commodity,
that makes paper money hold its
value—then and now. The real
standard is honesty, not gold.
Thus, as long as the Fed can
maintain its commitment to honest
money, the nation can enjoy the
benefits of a stable dollar. With so
much U.S. currency in circulation,
the government could be tempted
to cash in through inflationary
money creation. But excessive
seignorage hurts everyone holding
the currency. And while world
markets have selected the U.S.
dollar as the currency of choice,
that status could disappear quickly
if U.S. monetary policy stirred
doubts about U.S. money.
Honest money is the right policy.
For both U.S. citizens and the rest
of the world, honest money makes
good on the promise that a dollar
today will be worth a dollar tomor-
row, and honest money is what the
Federal Reserve works to achieve




1 Technically, the Treasury does pay
principal and interest on these debts,
but historically the Fed has returned all
principal and interest payments to the
Treasury. See W. Michael Cox, “Two
Types of Paper: The Case for Federal
Reserve Independence,” Southwest
Economy, November/December 1992,
for a description of the Treasury–Fed
interaction.
2 At minimum, the country’s government
can ensure some demand for its cur-
rency by requiring that taxes be paid
in it.
3 See Richard D. Porter and Ruth A.
Judson, “The Location of U.S. Currency:
How Much Is Abroad?” unpublished
mimeo, 1995. In addition, see Robert D.
Laurent, “Currency in Circulation and
the Real Value of Notes,” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 6 (2 1974):
213–26. Laurent estimated that at most 2
percent of currency is lost, for example,






ecent movements in the yen–dollar exchange rate
largely reflect relative business cycle movements
and expectations of near-term growth in the United
States and Japan. The yen–dollar exchange rate has
been subject to wide swings as Japan has struggled with
financial-sector difficulties and policy uncertainty.
The real value of the dollar relative to the yen has been
extremely volatile over the past year. In fact, on a monthly
basis, the real value of the dollar has been even more
volatile against the yen than against the Mexican peso.
From February to April 1995, the real value of the dollar















of less than 1
percent a year.
Japan’s unem-
ployment rate has reached new highs.
Some of Japan’s sluggishness is the result of banking
difficulties. Japan’s banking problems have not been
unlike those of the U.S. savings and loan crisis during
the late 1980s. Both had their seeds in overvalued asset
prices. The value of many assets on financial institutions’
books have plunged since late 1989 when the Japanese
stock market declined nearly 40 percent. Overall, Japan
has had to contend with declining prices. Japan experi-
enced 0.1 percent deflation in 1995. Deflation continued
in January and February 1996 as well. As asset prices
have fallen, lending has declined.
Japan’s government has attempted to bail out several
financial institutions that have large amounts of unrecov-
erable debt. A recent proposal to bail out mortgage
lenders drew strong opposition and resulted in a federal
budget impasse. On March 26, 1996, the legislature
passed a short-term budget that kept the government
operational and gave both sides 50 more days to resolve
the impasse. By mid-April, a budget compromise was
reached, but it excluded the proposal to bail out mort-
gage lenders.
Although Japan’s economy has been sluggish over
the past few years, signs of a recovery have emerged
recently. While U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP)
grew by an annualized 0.5 percent in the fourth quarter
of 1995, Japan’s real GDP grew by 3.6 percent. Capacity
utilization and new machinery orders increased in 1995,
with orders currently at their highest level in the past three
years. Housing starts have increased dramatically since
August, growing 7 percent in January 1996 compared


















positive signals. The yen has appreciated about 4 per-
cent against the dollar since the end of 1995. The Japa-
nese stock market index, the Nikkei, has hit the 22,000
mark, the highest level so far in 1996. Since April 1995,
the Nikkei has grown about 27 percent.
If these conditions continue, a sustained recovery is
possible. A poll conducted by The Economist magazine
indicates expectations of GDP growth of 2.3 percent in
1996 and 1997. A 2-percent growth rate would have
seemed sluggish by 1970s standards, but in 1996 it




Real Value of the Dollar Relative to the Japanese Yen











FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DATA
For more information on employment data,
see “Reassessing Texas Employment Growth”
(Southwest Economy, July/August 1993). For
TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial Production Index”
(Dallas Fed Economic Review, November 1989).
For  the Texas Leading Index and its components,
see “The Texas Index of Leading Indicators:
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas Fed
Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s BBS, Fed Flash
(214) 922-5199 or (800) 333-1953, and WWW
home page: www.dallasfed.org
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Texas Employment Total Nonfarm Employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
3/96 113.9 120.7 153.8 425.7 1,036.3 1,467.0 5,101.7 8,184.5 1,795.0 711.4
2/96 112.8 120.5 154.5 425.6 1,037.3 1,464.9 5,080.3 8,162.6 1,794.0 711.8
1/96 112.1 119.8 152.6 425.5 1,040.2 1,462.0 5,064.6 8,144.9 1,795.3 710.1
12/95 111.8 119.6 154.5 421.4 1,035.3 1,461.9 5,072.0 8,145.1 1,788.1 702.1
11/95 112.0 117.1 154.4 418.4 1,032.4 1,459.6 5,046.0 8,110.8 1,788.4 699.5
10/95 112.6 119.8 154.8 415.8 1,030.7 1,455.3 5,025.9 8,082.5 1,788.2 694.8
9/95 113.2 119.5 155.3 411.7 1,031.3 1,453.0 5,011.7 8,063.0 1,791.1 691.5
8/95 113.3 119.9 155.4 408.0 1,029.3 1,458.9 4,989.5 8,041.1 1,775.1 689.1
7/95 113.0 120.0 155.1 405.0 1,026.2 1,449.4 4,965.3 8,001.0 1,774.1 686.2
6/95 112.4 119.3 156.7 407.3 1,028.0 1,445.1 4,962.6 7,999.7 1,772.7 689.5
5/95 112.4 119.1 156.9 406.1 1,027.2 1,441.8 4,957.5 7,989.5 1,762.8 688.1
4/95 111.2 118.8 156.0 401.7 1,029.4 1,440.2 4,941.1 7,968.4 1,757.3 683.4
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Industrial Production Index
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Thousands of persons Index, January 1981 = 100
Leading index
Employment
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bottoming out in 1995, the Mexican
economy has been improving
slowly. The stabilization of the
Mexican economy helped boost
Texas exports to Mexico in fourth-
quarter 1995 after declines in the
first three quarters.
The Texas Leading Index strength-
ened in the first quarter of 1996,
following declines in late 1995.
March’s increase was the largest
since April 1995, and six of the eight
index components contributed gains.
Recent movements in the Texas
Leading Index suggest continued
expansion in coming months, and
perhaps even more vigorous growth
in the third and fourth quarters.
—D’Ann M. Petersen
The Eleventh District economy
continued to grow in the first quarter
of 1996 but not as robustly as in
1995. Recent movements in eco-
nomic indicators and an improving
Mexican economy suggest moderate
expansion in second-quarter 1996
that could gain momentum in the
second half of the year.
District job growth improved in
February and March after a sluggish
January. The District finished the
first quarter with an employment in-
crease of 2.1 percent (at an annual
rate), compared with 2.9-percent
job growth in 1995. Rapidly expand-
ing high-tech industries continued
to stimulate growth in business
services and construction, while
higher energy prices gave energy-
related industries slight job gains.
Growth in manufacturing jobs was
sluggish, but anecdotal reports
suggest orders picked up in April,
which could boost employment in
coming months.
Mexico’s continued improvement
could mean more Eleventh District
exports to Mexico and stronger
retail sales along the border. After12
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New Tools for Analyzing the Mexican Economy
Indexes of Coincident and Leading Economic Indicators
ä Just as U.S. leading economic indicators help predict what’s happening in the U.S. economy, new indexes
have been developed by Dallas Fed and Columbia University researchers to help analysts monitor trends
in the Mexican economy.
ä The economic analysis underlying the new indexes is detailed in the Dallas Fed’s second-quarter 1996
Economic Review by the researchers who developed the new tools, Dallas Fed economists Keith R. Phillips
and Lucinda Vargas (El Paso Branch) and Victor Zarnowitz, director, Center for International Business Cycle
Research, Columbia University. The issue is available on request from the Dallas Fed (1-800-333-4460 or
info@dallasfed.org).
ä The new coincident index comprises five data series that have been shown to track the business cycle move-
ments in many countries. The leading index comprises eight series from a variety of economic sectors and
processes that tend to lead movements in the Mexican economy.
ä The Center for International Business Cycle Research, Columbia University, will produce and monitor the new
economic indexes for Mexico.